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Who Directs Direct Democracy?
ELIZABETH GARRETT

t

Lawmaking by direct democracy has become an increasingly important part
of the legislative process at the state level. Voters in twenty-six states and the
District of Columbia have the right to propose legislation through the initiative
process, and voters in all states except Delaware must vote to approve changes
to their state constitutions.1 While the mechanisms of direct democracy are
not new-many date to populist and progressive movements at the turn of the
century-they are being used with greater frequency. During this decade, the
number of proposed initiatives and referenda are projected to exceed the
number proposed at the height of the progressive era (1910-19) by nearly one
hundred, 2 and more are expected to pass during the 1990s than ever before.'
The appeal of popular lawmaking is no surprise given the growing public
disillusionment with elected representatives. For example, in 1992, as part of
a presidential campaign fueled by voter alienation, Ross Perot proposed that
national leaders seek public input through frequent electronic town meetings
and that a national referendum be required to adopt important tax and budget
legislation.4 At the same time that supporters of federal and state term limits
t. Elizabeth Garrett is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.
She appreciates the helpful comments and suggestions of Professors Emily Buss, Phil
Frickey, Barry Friedman, Marci Hamilton, Dan Kahan, Larry Lessig, John Matsusaka,
Tracey Meares, Rick Pildes, Jane Schacter, David Strauss, and Mark Ramseyer, as well as
the invaluable research assistance provided by Tom Eggemeier and Matt Byrne. She is also
grateful for the financial support provided by the Russell Baker Scholars Fund at the
University of Chicago Law School.
1. Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and
Recall 2-3 (Harvard 1989); see also id at 2 (defining the different mechanisms of direct
democracy: the initiative, the referendum, and the recall).
2. David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?: An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U Colo L Rev 13, 27 Figure 1 (1995).
3. Id.
4. Michael Kelly, Perot's Vision: Consensus by Computer, NY Times Al (June 6,
1992). See also Jack Kemp, An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980's 187-89
(Conservative 1979) (proposal by the 1996 Republican vice-presidential candidate for a
constitutional amendment establishing a national initiative process); Remarks by Representative Richard A. Gephardt, A Democratic Plan for America's Economy: Toward a
Fairer,Simpler Tax Code (July 6, 1995) (proposing that tax rates could be increased only
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seek to transform legislatures into the domain of citizen-legislators, eligible
citizens already wield direct legislative power through their use of the initiative
and the referendum. As Thomas Cronin observes, direct democracy is attractive
to some reformers because of the "idealistic notion that populist democracy
devices can make every citizen a citizen-legislator and move us closer to
political and egalitarian democracy."6
In this essay, I dispute one of the central claims of supporters of direct
democracy-that such lawmaking is freer from special interest domination than
lawmaking by legislatures. I also challenge the supporters' claim that the
availability of the initiative and the referendum provides a desirable safeguard
to empower ordinary citizens, who believe that their voices are often unheard
by elected representatives! In fact, special interests, not ordinary citizens,
generally frame the terms of the debate concerning ballot measures. Special
interests have a comparative advantage in determining both what questions are
placed on the ballot for popular decision and how those questions are drafted.
I am not arguing that special interests are more powerful in the context of
direct democracy than in the halls of the state and national legislatures.
Rather, I am merely suggesting that both forums may be susceptible to interest
group pressures, although the specific groups that dominate each forum may
differ, and that neither structure may facilitate the enactment of legislation that
accurately reflects the popular will. Traditional lawmaking and direct lawmaking are different mechanisms used to aggregate and shape individual preferences, which may lead to different outcomes, but both are influenced
disproportionately by those groups that can express their preferences more
loudly or more clearly than other groups or individuals.
The judicial branch also plays a role in determining the direction of direct
democracy. Judges must interpret popularly-enacted laws, which are often
unclear in meaning or scope. Although most judges faced with questions
concerning the interpretation of direct legislation claim to be following the
directions of the voters, it seems unlikely that judges can accurately discern the
"popular intent" or even that such a clear, monolithic intent actually exists. If
intentionalism is not a legitimate interpretive method in this context, judges
should rely on other techniques to decide the meaning of contested language.
Very little scholarly attention has been directed to the appropriate method of
interpreting laws passed by direct democracy.' At the conclusion of this essay,
after a national referendum).
5.See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the CitizenLegislator, 81 Cornell L Rev 623 (1996) (discussing this goal which lies at the core of the
term limits movement and disputing whether the adoption of federal term limits would
achieve the objective).
6. Cronin, Direct Democracy at 6 (cited in note 1).
7. See, for example, David D. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative
Revolution 29-30 (Temple 1989).
8. Only one article on statutory interpretation in this context has been published in
the law reviews, Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas
in Direct Democracy, 105 Yale L J 107 (1995). The recent surge of academic interest in
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I offer some preliminary thoughts on this provocative question and on the role
courts might play in ameliorating the deliberative shortcomings of direct
democracy and in reducing the distorting influence of interest groups in the
process.
'I

Direct democracy is justified in part by the claim that it replaces the
influence of organized and well-heeled special interests with the unmediated
will of the people." Minority interests are thought to play a reduced role in
direct democracy-so much so that opponents of direct democracy fear that
lawmaking by popular vote empowers the majority without sufficiently
protecting minorities. Certainly, many recent high-profile ballot propositions
that have adversely affected certain minority groups suggest that this concern
is warranted." But in many other cases, relatively small groups that can
organize, amass substantial resources, and deploy their resources effectively can
dominate the process of direct democracy. These small groups are involved on
all levels-from drafting the direct legislation to collecting the signatures required to place a question on the ballot and from framing the debate during
the campaign to influencing the eventual outcome.
Getting a question on the ballot is not easy. Most efforts to submit a
question to the people fail to surmount the procedural hurdles standing in the
way of ballot access. In all states that allow popular lawmaking, a group
seeking a vote on a question must collect sufficient signatures to qualify a
proposal for the ballot. Typically, signature thresholds are set as a percentage
direct democracy has prompted a few scholars of statutory interpretation to turn their attention to direct democracy. See, for example, Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the
Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 Ann Surv Am L (1997)
(forthcoming) (presenting an integrated theory of constitutional and statutory interpretation).
9. Similarly, others have argued that the courts should adopt interpretive strategies to
achieve related goals with respect to representative legislatures. See, for example, Hans A.
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb L Rev 195 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 4 (1996).
10. See, for example, Patrick B. McGuigan, The Politics of Direct Democracy in the
1980s: Case Studies in Popular Decision Making 120 (Free Congress Research and Educ
Fnd 1985); Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers at 30-33 (cited in note 7).
11. See, for example, the California proposition prohibiting affirmative action programs,
CA Const, Art I, S 31, injunction vacated in Coalition for Economic Equity v Wilson,
Nos 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 US App LEXS 6512 (9th Cir 1997); the Arizona
proposition declaring English as the state's official language, AZ Const, Art XXVIII, ruled
unconstitutional in Yniguez v Arizona, 69 F3d 920 (9th Cir 1995), dismissed as moot,
Arizonans for Official English v Arizona, 117 S Ct 1055 (1997); the Colorado constitutional amendment affecting gays and lesbians, CO Const, Art I, S 30b, ruled unconstitutional in Romer v Evans, 116 S Ct 1620 (1996). See also Jonathan R. Macey, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Interest Group Theory, and the Founders' Design, 25 Rutgers L J 577,
582 (May 1994) (noting that Framers "rejected notions of direct democracy because
majority interests trammel minority rights under such a system").
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of the vote for Governor in the last election or as a percentage of the total
votes cast in the preceding general election.' The average number of signatures required is 7.5 percent of registered voters, with requirements ranging
from 2 percent in North Dakota for statutory initiatives to 15 percent in
Wyoming for the same type of question. 3 These percentages can translate
into a large number of signatures; for example, in California4 430,000 signatures were needed to qualify a question for the 1996 ballot.
According to some historians, in the early days of direct democracy,
signature drives often were occasions for a great deal of public deliberation."5
Supporters would bring petitions to meetings of civic groups and churches, and
people would debate the merits of the proposal as they considered whether to
sign. Whatever the truth of that rosy view of the past, such public discussion
no longer accompanies most signature drives. Indeed, signature gatherers work
diligently to avoid the delay inherent in public deliberation because they want
to fill petitions with names as quickly as possible. Speed is particularly essential in states that impose time limits of 90 to 150 days for groups to gather
signatures. 6
Given these obstacles to success, groups are increasingly turning to professional signature-gatherers (as well as professional drafters, media consultants,
and others with experience in the "initiative industry"). Professionals are
typically not interested in fostering public discussion; they want to earn their
money as quickly as possible and move on to the next job. In some states
where signatures can be solicited by mail, direct mail firms work to compile
lists of people who always return signature requests regardless of the topic of
the petition. Those who gather signatures through the more traditional "boothin-the-shopping-mall" method structure their interactions with the public to
discourage extended discussion and to avoid even revealing what issue the
petition proposes to place on the ballot. As one active participant in direct
democracy in California explained: "Why try to educate the world when
you're trying to get signatures?"' 7
Not only does the involvement of consultants affect the level and quality
of public discussion, but the cost of such expertise is beyond the reach of

12. David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United
States 41 Uohns Hopkins 1984).
13. Magleby, 66 U Colo L Rev at 22 Table I (cited in note 2). Some states also
impose geographic distribution requirements designed to force proponents to demonstrate
broad support throughout the state. Id at 21.
14. Elaine Korry and Bob Edwards, Ballot Initiatives Submitted by Internet, National
Public Radio's Morning Edition, Transcript No. 96110716-246 (Nov 7, 1996).
15. Cronin, Direct Democracy at 207-19 (cited in note 1).
16. Id at 62.
17. Id at 63 (quoting Ed Koupal, leader of California's People's Lobby). See also
McGuigan, Case Studies at 110 (cited in note 10) (quoting Sue Thomas, Research Director
of the National Center for Initiative Review: "The application of high tech political devices
to direct democracy . .. take[s] the initiative out of the realm of 'grass roots' political activity and places it squarely in the field of a business venture.").
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many who seek ballot access. Professional agencies charge up to $1.50 per
name in California (but as low as 30 cents per name in North Dakota)."8 Put
more concretely, at those prices, the cost of collecting enough signatures to
qualify a question for the California ballot in 1996 exceeded $600,000-a
price tag that many truly grassroots groups find difficult to meet. When added
to other expenses that must be incurred for ballot access, the cost in California
can reach $1 million before the campaign itself even begins. 9
California is considering a reform proposal that is designed to reduce the
importance of money in gathering signatures, but ultimately the reform, and
others like it, is likely only to empower a greater number of interest groups
without necessarily improving public deliberation or opening the process to
truly populist movements. California's Secretary of State is working to allow
signatures to be collected electronically over the Internet." This proposal will
reduce the cost of qualifying a question, although setting up a website and
publicizing it will still require resources. Even if the price of getting sufficient
signatures is reduced, as long as the price remains positive, interest groups will
retain an advantage relative to unorganized interests. However; the reform will
enable more groups to surmount the signature hurdle and force more popular
votes on issues they support.
Despite potentially increasing the number of groups that can gain access to
the process, a reform along the lines being considered in California may not
improve the level of public discourse. Those surfing the Internet at home may
be willing to read information about the proposal and discuss it with their
friends or in chat rooms, but flashy websites can also be set up to encourage
electronic signatures without generating much reflection. Interest groups, and
their hired guns, will still want to gather as many signatures as easily and as
quickly as possible. Such reforms do nothing to create economic incentives for
proponents of ballot questions to structure their electronic presentation in a
way that fosters reasoned and widespread discussion.
Even if electronic alternatives or other reforms are successful in decreasing
the cost of ballot access, money will continue to be important during the
campaign. First, supporters will expend resources to influence the drafting of
the text of the proposition itself and of any voter information pamphlets that
are disseminated by the state or local government. Even though the vast
majority of voters do not read or understand the legalese of the actual ballot
question or the dense prose that characterizes most information booklets, many
courts use these sources as guides to meaning when they interpret the results
of direct democracy.2' Organized groups with expertise in drafting and the
18. See Korry and Edwards, Ballot Initiatives (cited in note 14); Cronin, Direct
Democracy at 62 (cited in note 1). In 1988, the Supreme Court struck down a limitation
on the use of paid signature-collectors as a violation of the First Amendment. Meyer v
Grant, 486 US 414 (1988).
19. Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 Tex L Rev 1347, 1352 (1985)
(reviewing Magleby, Direct Legislation (cited in note 12)).
20. Korry and Edwards, Ballot Initiatives (cited in note 14).
21. Schacter, 105 Yale L J at 122 Tables 1-3 (cited in note 8). See also infra text at
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ability to influence officials who write pamphlets are better able to convince
courts to adopt interpretations that further their policy agendas than are
unskilled members of truly popular movements.
The bottom line is that informing the voters about the ballot question and
convincing them to vote in a certain way are expensive. The public receives
most of its information about initiatives and referenda through the media and
paid advertising,' so groups will concentrate their resources on shaping the
terms of the public debate through these avenues of information.' Campaign
advertising is important in all kinds of elections, whether the public is voting
for a ballot proposition or for a candidate, but in direct democracy, voters
have fewer informational cues to help them. For example, in candidate
elections, voters can glean helpful information from party affiliation and
incumbency status. While campaigns concerning ballot questions may include
similar information in the form of publicized endorsements by politicians and
other elites, the number and saliency of these cues are substantially reduced.
Professor Schacter puts this point another way. "The initiative process," she
writes, "frequently combines increased information costs with decreased informational resources." 2 4
A handful of studies suggests that the amount of money spent in a
campaign is crucial in determining the outcome of the vote. It appears that
disproportionate spending is more effective in opposition to a ballot question
than in support of one.' But one-sided spending (spending that exceeded
$250,000 and was at least twice as high as spending by the opposing side) in
support of ballot questions in California between 1968 and 1980 was also
associated with a higher rate of passage than the overall passage rate for ballot
questions during that time period.2" Moreover, Professor Lowenstein discovered that one-sided spending campaigns were characterized by "gross exaggera27
tion, distortion, and outright deception."

notes 47 and 48 (discussing effect of this situation on choice of methods of statutory
interpretation).
22. Id at 130.
23. The First Amendment blocks attempts to impose limitations on spending during
campaigns for initiatives or referenda. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US
765 (1978) (corporation's spending with respect to a ballot question protected by the First
Amendment); Citizens Against Rent Control v Berkeley, 454 US 290 (1981) (striking down
contribution limits in the context of ballot questions and distinguishing this case from
contribution limits in candidate elections).
24. Schacter, 105 Yale L J at 135 (cited in note 8).
25. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent
Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L Rev 505, 544-46
(1982). See also Cronin, Direct Democracy at 110-11 (cited in note 1) (discussing similar
results in a 1976 study done by John S. Shockley).
26. Lowenstein, 29 UCLA L Rev at 550 Table 3 (cited in note 25).
27. Id at 570. Interestingly, at least one survey indicates that voters are aware of the
influence of money on the results of direct democracy. So, a greater use of the initiative
and referendum may not cure the public perception that government is controlled by private interests. See Cronin, Direct Democracy at 100 Table 5.2 (cited in note 1).
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My purpose in emphasizing the role of money and the groups who can
raise it is not to argue that only the voices of wealthy special interests are
heard through direct democracy. Such well-funded voices are loud, but so are
the voices of other highly-motivated groups that can deploy cadres of dedicated volunteers. These groups have been successful in qualifying ballot proposals
on topics like the death penalty, term limits, abortion, and nuclear weapons.'
In addition, although full campaign coffers are helpful, they do not guarantee
success. Most ballot questions fail. Even where there is one-sided spending in
favor of a proposition, voters defeat the proposals two-thirds of the time.
Instead, my objective in addressing the influence of financial resources is
two-fold. First, it is to make clear that, in enacting initiatives and referenda,
unorganized and ordinary Americans play only a small role, just as they do
elsewhere in politics. Ordinary citizens do not determine the agenda of direct
democracy any more than they determine the agenda of the legislature. Rather,
the salience of issues for public debate and decision in both forums turns

largely on how organized interests spend their money to influence the media,
to pay for advertising, and to put issues before the public.' Direct lawmaking
requires resources, and organized groups are better able to raise and deploy
those resources than are the putative citizen-lawmakers.

However, it does seem likely, as Professor Briffault argues, that the interest
groups that succeed at direct democracy may be different from those who fare
well in the legislatures.30 The mechanics of enacting legislation differ in each

28. See Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers at 147-69 (cited in note 7) (case study of efforts
to place nuclear weapons freeze questions on ballot). For a list of the various subjects
covered by direct democracy, see McGuigan, Case Studies at 4 (cited in note 10). See also
Michael T. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators: A Theory of Political Markets 74-75
(Rutgers 1981) (distinguishing between groups "whose power base derives from money and
those whose base derives from sheer numbers").
29. For a discussion of the ability of certain groups to organize to affect political
outcomes, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 33-36, 50-51 (Harvard
1965); Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction 12-21 (Chicago 1991). For a discussion of collective action issues and the
formation of interest groups in the context of direct democracy, see Clayton P. Gillette,
Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 Mich L Rev
930, 974-77 (1988). See also Garrett, 81 Cornel L Rev at 685-86 (cited in note 5)
(discussing influence of interest groups in shaping the congressional agenda and determining which issues are politically salient).
30. Briffault, 63 Tex L Rev at 1357 (cited in note 19); see also id at 1358 (noting
that a significant number of initiatives have been supported by short-term interest groups
that form to promote a particular policy during the election and then disband); Kay
Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy
402 (Harper & Row 1986) (emerging interest groups channel energy to social movements
and protest activity). A number of the activist interest groups that Briffault identifies as
succeeding ir-the direct democracy arena also have a great deal of influence in legislatures
(for example, on issues like abortion and the death penalty). Briffault's observation frames
the question in a way that is different from many supporters of direct democracy. He
argues that the kind of interest group empowered is different, not that direct democracy
eliminates the influence of organized special interests. See Briffault, 63 Tex L Rev at 1357-
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forum, so one would expect that institutional differences among interest groups
would make a difference in their ability to influence the relevant lawmakers.
Further empirical work is necessary before we can determine which kinds of
interest groups succeed in each realm and whether some interest groups
dominate both kinds of lawmaking.
Second, merely analyzing the shortcomings of direct democracy does not
answer the question of whether this form of lawmaking is desirable. To fully
evaluate popular lawmaking, we must compare it with the alternative-governance by elected representatives. Moreover, our comparison must focus on the
reality of the state and federal legislative processes, rather than on some
idealized conception of representative democracy in which the legislature is
comprised of men and women replete with wisdom and civic virtue who rise
above current passions to pursue the public interest.3 The framers of the federal Constitution realized that the real world legislature would often diverge
from an ideal one. Accordingly, they constructed an institutional structure
designed to constrain the influence of factions and to2 encourage deliberation
even when enlightened leaders are not "at the helm."1
The structure of our government was intended to encourage lawmakers to
shape public preferences and to resist the temptation merely to ratify whatever
the public demanded in the heat of the moment.33 However, with the rise of
what Lawrence Grossman calls an "electronic republic,"3 4 the structure the
framers put into place to ensure public reflection seems increasingly fragile. In
part because the views of their constituents can be learned quickly and
relatively inexpensively, representatives are acting more often as the unquestioning agents of the electorate. Many political reforms currently under serious
consideration are supported with the argument that they will force legislators

61 (cited in note 19).
31. See also id at 1361-63 (criticizing Magleby's book for his failure to describe the
legislative process accurately).
32. Of course, the most famous discussion of this design is found in Federalist No 10.
Federalist 10 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 80 (Penguin 1961).
See also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539, 1548-49
(1988) (stating that "the belief in political deliberation is a distinctly American contribution to republican thought" and discussing the importance of public deliberation and
reasoned decisionmaking); Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to
Replace the Myth of Self-Rule With an Attorneysbip Model of Representation, 69 NYU
L Rev 477, 532-36 (1994) (arguing that structure of Congress was designed to foster

deliberation and the exercise of the legislator's independent judgment); Hanna Pitkin, The
Concept of Representation 195 (Cal Press 1967) (interpreting Madison as arguing that
legislators could withstand the influence of factions because the legislature provides a
forum where interests could be balanced, controlled, and stalemated).
33. See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and Shifting Preferences, in David Copp, Jean
Hampton, and John E. Roemer, eds, The Idea of Democracy 203 (Cambridge 1993) ("A
central point here is that preferences are shifting and endogenous rather than exogenous,
and as a result are a function of current information, consumption patterns, and general
social pressures.").
34. See generally Lawrence K. Grossman, The Electronic Republic (Viking 1995).
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to act more consistently with the wishes of the voters. s Representatives
increasingly choose governmental policies according to the results of opinion
polls and focus groups. 3 In short, modem representative democracy may be
operating more like a direct democracy, even in the absence of mechanisms
like the initiative or the referendum.
One objective of any comparison of direct democracy and traditional
lawmaking is to determine the proper allocation of decisions between the two
ways of legislating.37 The question is a comparative one: in particular cases,
which method of aggregating and shaping public preferences can best meet the
goals of a deliberative democracy that values reflection and reason-giving
before action is taken? In both cases, the preferences expressed by citizens are
mediated. In direct democracy, the primary filter is that of the interest groups
that draft the ballot question, shape the terms of the debate, and argue in
courts for certain interpretations of the direct legislation. In the legislature, representatives filter and shape public desires, but they are not alone in this role.
To the extent that surveys determine public policy, those who conduct the
38
polls and interpret the results affect the way the public will is perceived.
And, as with direct democracy, interest groups determine much of the legislature's agenda and disproportionately influence legislative outcomes.
As we work to solve this puzzle, we must adopt a dynamic approach that
takes account of the interactions between the two types of lawmaking.39 For

35. One example of such a reform is the adoption of term limits, which is often
justified with such arguments. See Garrett, 81 Cornell L Rev at 631-32 (cited in note 5).
36. The Contract with America, which shaped the agenda of the 104th Congress, was
formulated almost entirely on the basis of opinion surveys and polling data. Dan Balz and
Charles R. Babcock, Gingrich, Allies Made Waves and Impression: Conservative Rebels
Harassed the House, Wash Post Al, A14 (Dec 20, 1994). See also Richard Moin, Taking
the Pulse on Pulse-Takers, Wash Post Nat'i Wdy Ed 37 (Sept 23-29, 1996) (polling data
indicate that Americans prefer politicians to follow opinion polls more closely). But see
Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 Va L Rev 567, 578 (1996) (noting some
reasons that voters might not prefer that representatives faithfully followed survey results
in all cases).
37. As Richard Briffault observes, "We do not have to choose between the initiative
and the legislature .... The real issue is how well they work together, or, given that
even in initiative states government remains largely representative, whether the initiative
corrects some of the defects of the legislative process." Briffault, 63 Tex L Rev at 1350
(cited in note 19).
38. See Richard Morin, A Pollster's Peers Cry Foul, Wash Post Nat'l Weekly Ed 35
(Apr 28, 1997) (reporting that Frank Luntz, pollster associated with the Contract with
America, was reprimanded by leading professional organization for refusing to disclose the
wording of poll questions and violating ethical rules that mandate disclosure because it is
necessary to evaluate poll results).
39. Compare Dan M. Kahan, The Theory of Value Dilemma: A Critique of the
Economic Analysis of Criminal Law (unpublished manuscript on file with the author)
(discussing the "imperfection of each lawmaking institution relative to the others" and
concluding that "the decision of no one of these institutions can be held forth as embodying the community's 'true' aggregate valuation, which is in fact more likely to emerge
from overlapping jurisdiction and competition among these institutions").
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example, the availability of direct democracy may reduce the amount of legislative deliberation and discourage compromise if groups supporting a policy
change believe they can prevail in a popular vote.4" On the other hand,
elected lawmakers may be more willing to address certain issues that concern
their constituents if they know that supporters can circumvent them and go
directly to the people. 4 Or an issue may become more salient for elected
lawmakers once it has been the subject of a popular vote, even if the ballot
question fails. At the very least, however, it is clear that our choice is not
between lawmaking by citizens (direct democracy) and lawmaking by special
interests (representative democracy) because neither process is free from the
influence of organized groups that control large amounts of human and
financial resources.
Finally, if both forms of lawmaking diverge significantly from their
idealized versions, we must consider how to structure each to allow space for
reasoned decisionmaking42 and reduce the influence of special interests. I
suspect that legislative decisionmaking is more conducive to such structures in
most cases,4" but the answer is far from evident. The traditional legislative
process can be shaped by rules and procedures that are designed to allow an
opportunity for focused and careful deliberation of important issues.' Members of Congress can delegate to committees or staff members the respon-

40. See, for example, Magleby, 66 U Colo L Rev at 29 (cited in note 2) ("State legislators have also turned to the initiative to promote issues they cannot get passed in the
legislature. The temptation to pursue legislation in the public arena not only diverts
legislators from the work of the legislature, but encourages legislators to duck tough issues
and 'let the voters decide.'").
41. See Briffault, 63 Tex L Rev at 1367-69, 1375 (cited in note 19). For example, it
seems unlikely that the U.S. Congress would have voted on term limits proposals without
the pressure brought to bear by direct democracy. See Garrett, 81 Cornell L Rev at 62830 (cited in note 5). See also Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of
Popular Initiatives, 40 Am J Pol Sci 99 (1996) (finding that legislators in states that allow
initiatives pass parental consent laws that more closely resemble states' median voters'
preferences than legislators in states without initiatives).
42. See Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics:
Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71 Tex L Rev 1541, 1583 (1993)
(Deliberation is an activity that "results in a sharing of information by individuals who
have diverse experience or knowledge. Thus, like a jigsaw puzzle where different people
have different pieces, the deliberative process may improve problem solving."). But see
Gillette, 86 Mich L Rev at 944 (cited in note 29) (arguing that deliberation is only one
check for deterring special interests and that its absence does not mean that other ways
to protect the public interest are not sufficient to promote the public interest).
43. Compare Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 131
(Belknap 1996) ("From a deliberative perspective representation is not only necessary but
also desirable. The number of people who at the same time can have even a simple
conversation, let alone an extended moral argument, is limited.").
44. See, for example, Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Procedural Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U Kan L Rev 1113, 1172-73
(1997) (discussing the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act as an example of a procedural
framework to encourage congressional deliberation of certain issues).
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sibility to oversee the drafting of legislative language and to watch for interest
group activity that may be adverse to the public interest (or, more likely, to
their constituents' interests). The already numerous hurdles that characterize
the legislative process can be increased or strengthened, thereby raising the cost
of lawmaking to interest groups and checking some of the excesses of their
behavior. Courts can use judicial doctrines, like clear statement rules, to
encourage legislatures to articulate reasons for their decisions in the legislative
language."
Direct democracy can also be structured in a variety of ways to facilitate
public discussion. Indeed, the term "direct democracy" encompasses a variety
of different processes, some which contemplate a role for the legislature either
before the public vote or as a response to the outcome. Additional safeguards
can be adopted, such as requiring public hearings throughout the state before
a vote on a ballot question or mandating two votes of the citizens in order to
pass any proposition. The filter of representative democracy can be required
for all initiatives by allowing time for legislative action and deliberation before
the popular election. Disclosure rules can reveal the amount and source of
special interest spending in a particular election. Then, either the press or
opposing groups can use this information to highlight the question of interest
group domination for a relatively uninformed populace. If we believe that truly
grassroots movements require more time to garner support, very short time
limits for signature gathering can be lengthened. Again, empirical work is
needed to measure the effect of particular reforms on interest group activity.
Such studies of direct democracy, which promise to provide the empirical foundation for thoughtful and effective reform, are certainly possible now, given
the differences in procedures among states (and within states with regard to
different types of ballot propositions).
II
The structure of lawmaking-whether by the people directly or through
their elected representatives-is shaped in large part by the courts that interpret the laws that are produced. Yet legal scholars have not focused much
attention on the issues of interpretation that arise when a case concerns direct
legislation. This gap in the literature is more surprising than the absence of
study of the legislative process itself, because the latter is part of a general
court-centric perspective of legal scholars who emphasize the role of the courts
and largely ignore other legal institutions. The silence concerning the courts'
role in direct democracy stems instead from the federal-centric perspective of
our scholarship; direct democracy is exclusively a state and local concern
unless it presents federal constitutional issues." In this essay, I hope to raise
45. See, for example, Gregory v Asbcroft, 501 US 452, 467 (1991) ("We will not read
the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are included
...
[I]t must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it covers judges."). See also
Sunstein, 110 Harv L Rev at 27 (cited in note 9).
46. As a result, there is a relatively substantial body of work on the constitutional
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some of the questions that we must address in this area and to suggest the
kind of analysis that may be most fruitful.
Jane Schacter's study of state court decisions interpreting statutory initiatives demonstrates that most courts use "popular intent" as the best guide to
meaning when they are faced with vague or ambiguous language in direct legislation. Of the fifty-three decisions from eleven jurisdictions that she analyzes,
forty-five of them purport to apply some variant of intentionalism and claim47
to identify "collective intent," "the voters' intent," or "the people's intent."
Invocation of intent is problematic in the context of more traditionally-enacted
statutes; 4' reliance on it to understand unclear language passed through direct
democracy is entirely misguided. Techniques that might be used to interpret
statutes passed by the legislature, such as identifying the intent of the median
voter in certain circumstances or relying on statements of legislators who have
incentives to send credible signals, 4 are simply unavailable for the interpretation of direct legislation. There is no principled way to impute a clear, consistent, or illuminating intent to the electorate."0
If intent is an unreliable guide, what method of interpretation should a
court use? One alternative that is increasingly popular with judges is
textualism, a method which emphasizes the "plain meaning" of the statutory
language but also admits arguments based on textual coherence and certain
canons of statutory construction."1 Some of the justifications for a textual

issues raised by direct democracy. See, for example, Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of
Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L J 1503 (1990); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum:
Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 Wash L Rev 1 (1978); Hans A. Linde, When
Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 Or L Rev 19 (1993).
47. Schacter, 105 Yale L J at 117-18 (cited in note 8).
48. The literature casting doubt on the concept of a discernible legislative intent is
large and well-known. For one of the best and earliest discussions, see Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv L Rev 863 (1930). For recent analyses, influenced by the
insights of public choice, see Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 47-55, 95-102
(cited in note 29); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va L Rev 275, 297 (1988) (noting
that "[w]hat seems most striking about the dialogue among public choice-inspired legal
theorists writing about statutory interpretation is their piecemeal abandonment of the
archeological approach").
49. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 Law & Contemp Probs 3 (1994).
50. See William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the
Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice 233-41 (W.H. Freeman 1982);
Schacter, 105 Yale L J at 124-26 (cited in note 8) (canvassing the "familiar issues [that]
compromise the coherence of popular intent"). See also US Term Limits, Inc v Thornton,
115 S Ct 1842, 1911 (1995) (Thomas dissenting) ("Ifnquiries into legislative intent are
even more difficult than usual when the legislative body whose unified intent must be
determined consists of 825,162 Arkansas voters.").
51. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 23-29
(Princeton 1997). For discussions of textualism in the Supreme Court and the Circuit
Courts of Appeal, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
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approach appear to be less compelling in the case of direct democracy,
however First, if the argument for textualism is tied to intent, that is, if the"
interpreter is using the text of direct legislation as the best indication of the
voters' intent, the empirical data undermine this reasoning. The vast majority
of voters do not read the text of a ballot question or any official explanation
of it.s2 Ironically, the state judges who use intentionalist methods to interpret
direct legislation privilege the text and official documents when they search for
the voters' intent and ignore the sources of information like the press and paid
advertising that are much more likely to have shaped public understanding. 3For many of its proponents, however, textualism is not primarily a way to
understand intent; instead, they justify their use of this technique with rule :of
law arguments. For example, Justice Scalia explains that textualism can
encourage lawmakers to act more responsibly: "I think we have an obligation
to conduct our exegesis in a fashion which fosters the democratic process."5 4
If lawmakers know that courts will rely only on the text and certain canons
of construction that are laid out clearly and applied consistently, textualists.
argue, they will act accordingly. Legislatures will draft laws more precisely and
will attempt to reflect the results of their deliberations in the statutory text,
rather than in less accessible, and arguably more easily manipulated, sources
like legislative history.' Moreover, textualism provides lawmakers with a
strong incentive to monitor legislative language to ensure that it fairly reflects
what they hope to accomplish and to detect any narrow, interest-group deals
that would work to the detriment of their constituents.
This rule of law argument applies differently in the realm of popular
lawmaking because the incentives imposed by textualism play out differently.
If textualists hope to influence the behavior of citizen-legislators, they are un-,
likely to succeed. It is improbable that the voters will be aware of the judicial

L Rev 621 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal

Process, 12 Cardozo L Rev 1597 (1991). For a similar approach in which plain textual
meaning is a presumptive, rather than an absolute, interpretive norm, see Frederick
Schauer, Statutory Construction and the CoordinatingFunction of Plain Meaning, 1990 S

Ct Rev 231 (1990); Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A
Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 Vand L Rev 715, 728-37 (1992).
52. Magleby, Direct Legislation at 136-39 (cited in note 12).
53. Schacter, 108 Yale L J at 130 (cited in note 8) (terming this phenomenon "the
paradox of the inverted informational hierarchy").
54. United States v Taylor, 487 US 326, 346 (1988) (Scalia concurring in the
judgment). See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 Harv L Rev 593, 639-40 (1995) (labeling such judges as
"disciplinarians"); Zeppos, 12 Cardozo L Rev at 1637-38 (cited in note 51) (describing the
reform agenda of Scalia's textualism). See also generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989) (providing rule of law arguments
supporting a textualist approach).
55. See Cass R. Sunstein, Democratic Formalism, Yale L J (forthcoming review of
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton 1997))
(discussing this aspect of Justice Scalia's textualist approach and casting doubt on-its
ability to achieve these goals given institutional limitations).
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approach or will take the time to read the text. Even if voters attempt to
respond to the prevailing interpretive method, studies reveal that the language
of ballot questions is too difficult and dense for most of the electorate to
understand. s6 Moreover, voters do not have trustworthy agents on whom they
can rely to read the language, assess its effect, and protect their interests.
Unlike legislators, they do not have committees and staff to sift through the
information provided by lobbyists and special interests, and they lack the
expertise in many cases to make informed independent judgments. Instead, the
average citizen gets her information from the media and from advertising paid
for and written by interested parties. So, the incentives of textualism are
unlikely to have much effect on citizen-legislators.
But perhaps textualists intend to direct their incentives toward the drafters
of ballot questions, not the voters. Much direct legislation is shaped by
professional organizations; thus, ballot proposals are drafted by repeat players
who can learn the rules of statutory interpretation and behave accordingly. s7
Some states also provide groups seeking ballot access the services of state
officials who have drafting experience"8 and who can be expected to respond
to judicial incentives. Now the pertinent question becomes whether incentives
placed on these more sophisticated players "foster the democratic process" or
merely strengthen the hand of special interests who can hire the most expert
legislative drafters.
The possibility that the textualist approach primarily will allow special
interests more influence seems likely enough to cause some worry. Given the
voters' general ignorance of the text and the legal landscape into which the
direct legislation is enacted, experienced drafters can precisely set forth the text
of legislation in a way that ensures textualist judges will interpret the law so
as to benefit the group supporting it. Professor Schacter articulates this concern: "The unfamiliarity of legal terminology to many voters creates powerful
leverage for the initiative's drafters, for it enables them to have an unseemly
private dialogue of sorts with the courts, who also understand these terms." 9
This concern is not merely academic. Cases in which courts have interpret-

56. Magleby, Direct Legislation at 138-39 and Table 7.4 (cited in note 12). See also
Comment, Interpretation of Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Canons of
Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 Santa Clara L Rev 945, 954
(1994) (contrasting legislator/legislative behavior with voter attention to official sources of
information about a proposed initiative).
57. See Briffault, 63 Tex L Rev at 1351 (cited in note 19) (describing the "initiative
industry" which is characterized by "petition management" firms); Frickey, 1996 Ann Surv
Am L (cited in note 8) (same); supra text at notes 15 through 17.
58. Cronin, Direct Democracy at 208 (cited in note 1).
59. Schacter, 105 Yale L J at 128 (cited in note 8). See also Daniel M. Warner, Direct
Democracy: The Right of the People to Make Fools of Themselves? The Use and Abuse
of Initiative and Referendum, A Local Government Perspective, 19 Seattle U L Rev 47,

78 (1995) ("But proponents of initiatives have no particular incentive to curb their
legislation's extremism, especially considering that voters are not likely to read the
proposal, either when they sign it or when it is on the ballot.").
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ed ballot initiatives reveal the possibility that textualist approaches could2
further empower sophisticated drafters. For example, a Maryland referendtii'i
drafted by county officials sought to limit the waiver of governmental immunity. 0 Fearing that courts would strike down the limitation, sever the limiting
language from the rest of the amendment, and find that the referendum was
a complete waiver of governmental immunity, the drafters included an
inseverability clause. Indeed, because a state court had already struck down a
similar immunity limitation," the only real change wrought by the popularvote was the adoption of the inseverability clause. If the court had enforced
the clause, then it would have found no waiver of governmental immunity,,
and the plaintiffs' tort suit against the county would have been dismissed. Th~d'
court declined to enforce the plain language of the amendment6 2 because it
believed that the electorate could not have been aware of the presence or the
effect of the inseverability clause. The court properly declined to participate in
an unseemly textualist dialogue with the wily county officials. 3
In initiative contests dominated by only one strong interest group, thete2
may be no competing interest to sound the alarm to reveal overreaching o6r
undesirable rent-seeking in the language of a ballot question. Even when an
opposing group is active, its weapons are limited. Opponents can try to defeat
the initiative, or they can qualify a contradictory question and hope that it is
simultaneously enacted, thereby ensuring interpretive confusion that they may
be able to use to their advantage." They cannot seek compromise to accommodate their concerns, however, because the text of a proposal cannot be
changed once it has been placed on the ballot.
Thus, in an important way, the legislative process differs from direct
lawmaking. Direct legislation, which is not filtered through a committee system
and which may not provoke close scrutiny by informed persons, can be drafted
by sophisticated players so that the self-serving text is pellucid. Textualist
judges, who remain true to their method, help to guarantee that those who
succeed in passing such clearly-worded initiatives will be richly rewarded. The
traditional legislative process includes safeguards that often force interest
groups to hide their deals, accept compromise language, and risk judicial
interpretations contrary to their objectives."5

60. See Surratt v Prince George's Cty, 320 Md 439, 578 A2d 745 (Md App 1990).
61. See Prince George's Cty v Fitzbugh, 308 Md 384, 519 A2d 1285 (Md App 1987).
62. Courts have sometimes declined to enforce clear inseverability clauses enacted bylegislatures, although for other reasons. See Israel E. Friedman, Comment, Inseverability
Clauses in Statutes, 64 U Chi L Rev 903, 905-06 (1997) (critiquing current judicial
attitude and suggesting an alternate approach).
63. But see DaFonte v Up-Right, Inc., 2 Cal 4th 593, 596, 828 P2d 140 (1992)
(adopting plain meaning approach to determine interpretation of complicated tort reform
statute affecting joint and several liability, noneconomic damages, and relationship with
workers' compensation statute).
64. For a discussion of the latter technique and the interpretive challenges sucs a
strategy presents, see Eule, 99 Yale L J at 1517-18 (cited in note 46).
65. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statut6f-y-,
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If we believe the notion of the "people's intent" to be meaningless, and we
judge the fit between the objectives of textualism and the reality of direct
lawmaking to be awkward, what interpretive method is left? Traditionally, the
third method of interpretation is purposive; its proponents often draw on the
insights of the legal process method of Professors Hart and Sacks." The type
of purposive approach I have in mind does not seek to identify the voters'
actual purpose. If the purpose that guides interpretation must be that which
animated the enactors, Professor Schacter is entirely correct to observe that
"the purpose inquiry is wholly circular when the very question at issue is what
purpose the voters had in passing a law. Shifting the inquiry to purpose does
not solve so much as restate the basic problem by shifting the indeterminacy
to a higher level of abstraction." 67
Purposivism need not be tied to actual intent. Indeed, the Hart and Sacks
approach to interpreting statutes is not so constrained. Instead, through a
process of reasoned elaboration, interpreters resolve uncertainties about
meaning in order to achieve purposes that they believe reasonable legislators
acting reasonably would have been pursuing. A purposive interpretation is also
an attempt to integrate the law coherently and harmoniously into the legal system as a whole."8 Similarly, Jane Schacter and Philip Frickey, two legal
scholars who have written about interpreting direct legislation, favor purposive
approaches that are informed by normative visions of the legislative process.69
They seek to implement interpretive regimes that will compensate for shortcomings in the direct democracy process. Although their proposals are not
direct applications of the legal process method-indeed, Professor Frickey
argues that Hart and Sacks "embodied the ideal of republican legislative
deliberation into their theory, which makes it hard to translate to ballot

Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colurn L Rev 223, 251 (1986) (explaining
why hidden-implicit deals are more commonplace in traditional legislation than openexplicit deals). See also Magleby, 66 U Colo L Rev at 40 (cited in note 2) (noting lack
of non-judicial filters in the direct democracy context).
66. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, eds, Hart and Sacks's The
Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Foundation 1994).
The authors spend little time on direct legislation. See id at 649-70.
67. Schacter, 105 Yale L J at 146 (cited in note 8).
68. Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 1374-78 (cited in note 66). See also William
N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The
Legal Process in id at li, xcii (describing the purposive approach of Hart and Sacks);
Frickey, 1996 Ann Surv Am L (cited in note 8) (noting that a normative, rather than
descriptive, understanding best explains the legal-process theory of Hart and Sacks); Peter
Strauss, Comment, Legal Process and Judges in the Real World, 12 Cardozo L Rev 1653,
1659-60 (1991) ("Hart and Sacks were not naive enough to think they were describing
an actual legislature; they were prescribing an attitude toward legislation that would be
appropriate for a judge, despite the contrary reality such sophisticated observers knew even
a half-hearted observer would quickly discover.").
69. See generally, Schacter, 105 Yale L J at 107 (cited in note 8); Frickey, 1996 Ann
Surv Am L (cited in note 8).
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measures" 7 -- their views of interpretation as a value-laden enterprise designed
to improve the lawmaking process and rationalize its output seem to grow out
of a legal process framework.
Guided by her metademocratic conception of statutory interpretation,
Professor Schacter proposes that courts use two specific approaches when
interpreting direct legislation. 71 First, she proposes opening up the litigation
process beyond the adversaries in a particular case to encourage the participation of a wide range of interests.' In this way, informed public deliberation,
which so frequently does not occur before a vote on a ballot proposition, will
occur in the courtroom. Schacter's strategy, which may require courts to make
judgments for which they are not well-suited or to oversee processes that are
beyond their competence, should not be the first reaction to the problems that
beset direct democracy. Rather, we should work to implement structures to
shape the process of direct lawmaking, and perhaps consider judicial approaches that fit more comfortably within the institutional expertise of the courts,
before we ask judges to embark on such a complex and unfamiliar task. If
reforms are not adopted to encourage public discussion during the campaigns
on ballot questions or if safeguards are not developed to allow clarification of
and compromise regarding the text before it is enacted, perhaps courts will
have to play the more activist role Professor Schacter envisions. Certainly,
courts have done so in other instances (such as school desegregation, prison
reform, and voting rights cases), although with varying degrees of success.
Given the preliminary nature of her proposal, it seems likely that further
refinement of Professor Schacter's ideas will indicate more concretely how
judges will administer a proceeding that diverges radically from a traditional
lawsuit.73
Second, Professor Schacter favors narrow interpretations of direct legislation when courts have reason to believe that the popular election was tainted
by the campaign war chests and armies of volunteers controlled by organized
and wealthy special interests. 4 Regardless of whether these judicial techniques
would solve the problem of disproportionate interest group influence on ballot
propositions,"5 her objective of structuring interpretation in order to improve
the quality of public deliberation on direct legislation is precisely the sort of
purposive goal that is needed in this area.
Professor Frickey's treatment is somewhat different because he seeks to
integrate theories of constitutional and statutory interpretation. He argues that
both should "attempt to achieve two goals, which are sometimes in tension:

70. Id.
71. See Schacter, 108 Harv L Rev at 593 (cited in note 54); Schacter, 105 Yale L J
at 161-62 (cited in note 8).
72. Id at 155-56.
73. I particularly appreciate Jane Schacter's comments on this issue.
,
74. Id at 157.
75. See Frickey, 1996 Ann Surv Am L (cited in note 8) (explaining why "as formijlatif
ed, .... neither [proposal] is likely to have much impact upon public law").
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respect for public values, especially constitutional values, including the republican value of representative government; and respect for direct democracy as an
institution and the people as lawmakers."76 Because courts have held attacks
on direct lawmaking under the constitutional provision that guarantees a
republican form of government to be nonjusticiable, 7 he urges courts to use
substantive canons of construction to protect this underenforced constitutional
norm. Courts have relied on quasi-constitutional canons to enforce structural
constitutional values such as federalism and separation of powers when they
believe that more absolute protection would require them to venture into areas
that lack judicially discoverable and manageable standards." Professor Frickey
also favors a sophisticated use of such canons in this context to allow courts
to mediate the tension between the public values of republican government and
the value of according due respect to the will of the people."
While I find the interpretive approaches of both Schacter and Frickey
attractive, let me suggest a related judicial approach that could help to situate
direct lawmaking in the republican landscape so that both the will of the people and the need for thoughtful deliberation are respected. In some states,
supporters of a ballot question can choose the form of their proposal; they can
seek change through adoption of a constitutional amendment or a statutory
initiative. Propositions adopted as constitutional amendments can be changed
only by a subsequent vote of the people, but statutory enactments can be
amended either by another popular vote or by the legislature."0 Moreover,
constitutional amendments are immune from state constitutional challenges.
Interestingly, although constitutional amendments are therefore significantly
more durable (and thus more valuable to supporters), there is little difference
in the passage rates for the two types of initiatives.8 ' Not surprisingly, then,
activists prefer to work to enact constitutional amendments, thereby entrenching their proposals and insulating them from further change.
Because public deliberation on much direct legislation is not robust and
informed, we may be disturbed that there will be little opportunity to change
these laws even if modification seems warranted after further reflection or due
to changed circumstances. Courts should respond to this concern by policing
the boundary between constitutional amendments, which should only structure

76. Id.
77. See, for example, Pacific States Tel and Tel Co v Oregon, 223 US 118 (1912).
78. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand L Rev 593 (1992);
Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1179-81 (cited in note 44) (discussing clear statement rules
in the context of federalism).
79. See Frickey, 1996 Ann Surv Am L (cited in note 8) (discussing his approach in the
context of applying the canon to interpret legislation so as to avoid constitutional
infirmity).
80. Magleby, 66 U Colo L Rev at 13 (cited in note 2).
81. David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation in the American States, in David Butler and
Austin Ranney, eds, Referendums around the World 218, 229 (Am Enterprise Institute
1994).
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or limit state or local governmental powers, and legislation. One judicial
strategy would be to adopt a heavy presumption that proposals that are hard
to classify should be considered as legislative initiatives and therefore susceptible to subsequent modification by the legislature."2 Such a presumption might
be justified by the federal constitutional norm embodied in the clause that
guarantees every state a republican form of government. 3 The approach
could result in courts' recharacterizing ballot questions as statutory initiatives
or, if recharacterization is not possible, in their adopting more generous methods of interpretation for such ballot propositions, thereby encouraging interest
groups to consider this route, notwithstanding its lower durability.
This proposed canon is not unproblematic. First, determining whether.a
proposal is structural or legislative is not an easy task," particularly because
many state constitutions are quite detailed and contain provisions that seem
more properly within the province of the legislature."5 At the borders, courts
should err on the side of characterizing proposals as legislative. Second, as
Professor Eule concludes from anecdotal evidence and intuition, state judges
are unlikely to be willing to apply this kind of approach aggressively. 6 The
attitudes of these judges, who tend to be elected, is important because they are
the primary interpreters of direct legislation. Third, the approach I suggest is
not available in states which allow for popular votes on constitutional amendments but which do not provide for statutory initiatives or referenda.
Finally, one might argue that recharacterizing constitutional amendments
as legislation does not sufficiently respect the voters' choice of form. Yet, I
suspect that voters have not given much thought to the difference between
constitutional amendments and statutory initiatives and that the preference for

82. This proposal is suggested by two articles on direct democracy. Most directly,
Justice Linde makes a similar argument. See Hans A. Linde, Who is Responsible for
Republican Government?, 65 U Colo L Rev 709, 716-18 (1994). Professor Eule also
distinguishes between types of plebiscites in his work on constitutional interpretation. See
Eule, 99 Yale L J at 1573-78 (cited in note 46).
83. US Const, Art IV, S 4. I appreciate Phil Frickey's comments on this point.
84. See Jesse H. Choper, Observations on the Guarantee Clause-As Thoughtfully
Addressed by Justice Linde and Professor Eule, 65 U Colo L Rev 741, 746 (1994). See
also Gillette, 86 Mich L Rev at 983 (cited in note 29) (noting difficulty of determining
whether a proposal is legislative, and therefore suitable for use of the initiative or
referendum power, or whether it is administrative).
85. See, for example, OK Const, Art XIII, S 7 (states that the legislature shall provide
for teaching of agriculture, horticulture, stock feeding, and domestic science); CA Const
Art XB, S 6 (establishes fees for fishing permits during years 1991-1993); AZ Const, Art
XXVI, S 1 (lists the powers of real estate brokers who have licenses).
86. Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the
Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U Colo L Rev 733, 736 (1994). See also Frickey, 1996
Ann Surv Am L (cited in note 8) (providing further evidence); id ("fl]t makes it especially
difficult to apply quasi-constitutional statutory interpretive techniques, for the only judges
who may engage in authoritative interpretation of state legislation-state judges-may, be
less likely to embrace the quasi-constitutional techniques designed to mediate constituffonal
values and statutory meaning.").
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one form over another is really that of the drafters. I may have reached this
conclusion too easily, however. It is possible that voters do not want their
direct legislation to be susceptible to revision by the legislature and prefer
extremely durable popular enactments. My proposal would then have to be
justified on the ground that concerns about the flaws in public deliberation
outweigh concerns about disrespecting the desires of the voters.
III
As I noted at the outset, my purpose in this essay is to identify concerns
about the entities who control the direction of direct democracy and to suggest
some approaches to consider in addressing these concerns. It is clear, however,
that when courts choose among methods of interpretation, they must be aware
of the realities of direct lawmaking. Moreover, the norms that inform their
choice should include a concern for deliberation and the due process of
lawmaking, 7 but those principles play out differently when the laws are the
product of popular vote, rather than of legislators.
Increased scholarly interest in direct democracy"8 provides an opportunity
to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of the entire legislative framework. The legislative process includes state and local actors, political and
judicial entities, interest groups and average citizens, monied interests and
ideologically-motivated activists. A full and accurate description of these
realities can help us construct procedures for representative government and
direct democracy that enhance the opportunity for public deliberation and
rational discourse, thereby improving both kinds of lawmaking. Courts can
then choose among methods of interpretation with a recognition of the ways
that other players will react to their decisions. As a result, courts will be more
likely to reconcile the various important, but sometimes competing, constitutional norms.

87. The concept of due process of lawmaking has most frequently been discussed in
the context of judicial strategies to improve congressional deliberation and decisionmaking.
See generally Linde, 55 Neb L Rev at 197 (cited in note 9); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212
(1978). See also Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1182-83 (cited in note 44) (applying concept
to development of procedures to encourage congressional deliberation).
88. See Symposium, Ballot Initiatives and the Law: The Legitimacy of Direct Democracy, 1996 Ann Surv Am L (forthcoming); Special Collection, Perspectives on Direct
Democracy, 4 U Chi L Sch Roundtable (1997). A forthcoming casebook, which systematically explores the law of democratic politics, devotes an entire chapter to issues concerning
direct democracy. See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The
Law of Democracy: Legal Regulation of the Political Process (1998).

